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Labour law on the plateau: towards regulatory policy for endogenous norms 
 
Deirdre McCann1  
 
Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the post-crisis evolution of a pivotal transnational labour law narrative: that 
of the World Bank. The recent evolution of the Bank’s account of labour law initially offered models 
of minimal regulation. After the crisis, however, it has generated more elaborate depictions of 
legitimate, or desired, labour regulation. Yet this crucial transnational institution remains unsettled 
on the substantive content of these expanded frameworks and on the nature and functioning of the 
norms that they embody. The paper tracks the evolution of the imagery of labour law generated by 
the World Bank over the last decade, from the Doing Business project to the 2013 World 
Development Report. The broader purpose is to take this evolution as an opportunity to consider the 
notions of legal regulation of markets that have been elevated by the crisis and the pertinence of 
contemporary labour regulation scholarship on international legal policy narratives. 
 
In doing so, the paper addresses the autonomy of labour law in both discourse and institutional 
function. At the discursive level, it attends to the reception of legal regulation in economic policy and 
research narratives, and in particular to their rendition of the form, dynamics, and objectives of legal 
regulation. On the institutional dimension, the paper argues that the regulatory policy of the World 
Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO) can usefully be conceived of as dynamic 
processes of institutional convergence and divergence. More broadly, the paper explores an 
important refashioning of the Bank’s vision of labour law – grounded in the image of a ‘regulatory 
plateau’ – that embraces the benefits of regulation and embeds a more sophisticated conception of 
the operation of regulatory regimes. 
 
In this regard, the paper contributes to a line of legal scholarship that has tracked and assessed the 
trajectory of transnational labour law narratives. Rittich, centrally, has examined the influence of 
regulatory narratives generated by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on the nature and 
function of legal regulation2 and, more recently, the diversification of the international-level sources 
of labour law guidance.3 The paper is also a contribution to the evolving academic reflections, 
including by the author, on the narratives of labour regulation that are generated by economic 
theoretical, research and policy discourses,4 and is aligned with recent work that offers a neo-
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institutional account of legal regulation in which legal rules are rendered as endogenous to the 
market.5 The paper points to key limitations that should be addressed for a more robust and 
effective vision of labour regulation at the international level. 
 
1. Quantified flexibility: the decline and fall of the Employing Workers Index 
 
During much of the last decade, the Doing Business project was the World Bank’s flagship 
engagement with labour regulation.6 The project is now familiar.7 It evaluates a range of ‘business 
regulations’ from around 190 countries using a set of indicators that quantify and compare sub-fields 
of legal regulation (starting a business; dealing with construction permits; getting electricity; 
registering property; paying taxes; trading across borders; getting credit; protecting investors; 
enforcing contracts; resolving insolvency; and employing workers).8 The project provides an overall 
aggregate ranking in a Ease of Doing Business Index, disseminates its results through a series of 
annual reports9, and identifies, celebrates and rewards countries whose regulatory frameworks are 
most favourable to the ‘business environment.’10 The project’s engagement with labour regulation is 
through the ‘Employing Workers Index’ (EWI), which measures and compares laws on ‘hiring’ (fixed-
term contracts; minimum wages); working hours (night work, weekly rest, weekly hours, paid annual 
leave); and redundancy. Each sub-indice ranges from 0 to 100 and is a simple average of a set of 
binominal indicators that assess elements of domestic labour law regimes.11 Based ostensibly on the 
work of Botero and colleagues,12 the EWI can be situated in the trend towards research projects that 
quantify and compare labour regulations.13  
 
The Doing Business project has been the subject of intense and sustained criticism, which has 
ultimately triggered an ongoing process of reform. The most damaging criticisms have been directed 
at the project’s engagement with labour regulation.14 For present purposes, two key themes can be 
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identified among the assessments of the EWI’s conception and design. These interrogate two 
interlinked set of assumptions that are encoded in the Index’s methodology and associated rhetoric 
on (1) the substantive scope of legitimate labour regulation and (2) the nature, functioning, and 
effects of regulatory frameworks.  
 
To elaborate on the first theme, it is well-rehearsed that the account of the legitimate subject-
matter of labour regulation offered by the Doing Business project is highly constrained.15 Less 
frequently observed is that this sparse portrait is grounded in a conviction that labour rights can be 
neatly divided into the fundamental and the residual. The core/non-core narrative enshrined by the 
ILO in its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work has been pivotal to the 
conceptual framing, methodology and rhetorical stridency of the Doing Business project.16 
Unleashed by the ILO into the sphere of international labour regulation policy, the Declaration’s 
assertion that the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining and to protection from 
forced labour and child labour are fundamental has had consequences that have been predictable, 
yet perhaps unexpectedly enduring. Among the most substantial is that a rendition of 
fundamentality is at the heart of both methodology and policy discourse in Doing Business. The 
core/non-core distinction is embedded in the selection of the regulatory subjects measured by the 
EWI sub-indices, which target only non-core elements of transnational and domestic labour law 
schema (employment protection, minimum wages, working time). At the rhetorical level, it is a point 
of honour in the Doing Business literature that none of the ‘core’ entitlements are subject to 
quantification, measurement or ranking.17 Non-core regimes, in contrast, have explicitly been 
conceived of as harbourers of damaging economic impacts.18  
 
The 1998 Declaration was condemned, most prominently by Alston, as the ill-judged bifurcation of 
what was conceived of as an integrated international labour code.19 Other contributions have 
stressed that the regulatory objectives subordinated by the Declaration, and more broadly during 
the core rights era, are centrally those towards the improvement of working conditions.20 For 
present purposes, the pivotal consequence of the Declaration is that the World Bank grasped the 
core/non-core duality - in the kind of deployment feared by Alston and others - to profoundly 
diminish non-core rights.  
 
The transmission of the core/non-core schema illuminates the analysis of the institutional autonomy 
of labour law at the international level. The recent history of international labour law has been 
characterised by Rittich as a process of fragmentation in which competing or converging norms and 
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regulatory guidance are transmitted by a multiplying array of actors.21 Within this analytical 
framework, the relationship between the ILO and World Bank in the decade from the Declaration to 
the global financial crisis can be read as signalling not merely a convergence of narratives but an 
institutional convergence, which pivots on the role of these two institutions in fashioning and 
disseminating regulatory policy. On closer analysis, further, this institutional convergence can be 
understood to embody layers of interaction that have, in aggregate, curbed the institutional 
autonomy of the ILO.  
 
First, the Doing Business project relays an account of the economic impact of labour regulation, 
including on regulatory subjects shared with the ILO’s standards. Predicting labour’s regulation’s 
economic effects is a role on which the World Bank has long staked a claim. Yet Doing Business has 
not merely reiterated the familiar - abstract - narrative of labour regulation’s inhibiting effects. The 
project has also, second, propelled a convergence in legal policy strategy towards detailed guidance 
on the design of legal frameworks. As has been argued elsewhere, the EWI has translated open-
textured flexibility narratives into detailed prescriptions for legal design, sending a ‘message to law’ 
to legal policy actors.22 This advisory role had previously been assumed to be primarily the domain of 
the ILO, at least at the level of generic global guidance (guided by the regulatory frameworks that 
are suggested by the standards). Third, on the most fundamental level, a claim was staked in the 
Doing Business project that narratives of the relevance and status of the ILO’s standards could be co-
piloted by the World Bank. The borrowing of the core/non-core dichotomy by Doing Business can 
therefore be identified, with hindsight, as the death-knell of the ILO’s unchallenged pre-eminence in 
the international labour law arena. The outcome is that the Organization no longer assuredly 
governs its own discourses on legal regulation, including as they relate to ILO norms.  
 
The Doing Business project therefore shifted the Bank onto institutional and legal policy terrain 
conventionally occupied by the ILO. In this analysis, Doing Business elevated the ILO, by integrating 
its standards and concepts (decent work, fundamental rights and principles) into the economic 
debates on labour regulation. The Declaration has also helped substantially to shield the most 
precarious of the fundamental rights from the sights of the International Financial Institutions, 
namely the right collectively to bargain. Yet it simultaneously diminished the Organization’s 
normative authority by destabilizing already neglected discourses on the role of the ILO’s non-core 
standards in contemporary economic life (including regulatory objectives that are co-pursued 
through collective bargaining). In the transmission of the core/non-core narrative, the ILO set the 
frame but was unable or unwilling to dictate the path of the engagement.  
 
Such paths of convergence with the Bank, and other transnational legal policy and adjudicative 
institutions, appear to be exercising an internal paralysis among ILO policy and legal actors. The first 
report of the new Director-General of the ILO to the June 2013 International Labour Conference 
revealed an internal unease over the normative dimension of the ILO’s work.23 The report admits to 
an fraught internal debate - ‘described by some as a crisis’24 – centred on standard-setting. The focus 
of the DG’s Report is partly on the future of the Organization’s oversight mechanisms and standard-
setting, but also embraces the dissemination of existing norms. It is particularly notable that the 
Report in part attributes the normative crisis to institutional and discursive convergence,  
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[P]aradoxically, one of the reasons cited for the emergence of controversy at this point 
in the ILO’s history is precisely that the outputs of the supervisory system are 
increasingly influential as a reference point in numerous settings outside the ILO itself.25  
 
The second key theme that unites prominent criticisms of Doing Business is the limitations of the 
EWI in capturing the nature, functioning, and therefore impact of labour market regulations.  Certain 
of the Index’s deficiencies in this regard are technical: they are grounded in a misreading of legal 
systems as a whole or the interaction of the internal components of labour law systems.26 The Index 
does not recognise functional equivalents of statutory regulation, for instance, thereby downgrading 
regimes that regulate predominantly via bargaining.27 It also misreads how certain components of 
regulatory sub-fields interact and whether the classification of legal data will accurately capture the 
measurement goals of the sub-indices.28  
 
Given the Bank’s subsequent conversion to the merits of labour regulation, traced in the following 
Section, the most salient critique of Doing Business is the overarching analysis that probes the 
theoretical underpinnings of the project.29 This literature has argued that Doing Business rests on a 
model of development that, by neglecting most of the benefits of regulation, embeds the tenets of 
orthodox economic theory.30 The critique embraces the assessment of labour standards in the EWI, 
which is configured to restate, in quantified form, orthodox economic theory’s stark dichotomy 
between regulation and deregulation.31 As Davies and Freedland have observed in their investigation 
of labour law’s autonomy, the deregulatory account of labour law holds there to be ‘a simple, direct, 
relationship between the removal of the protections of labour law and the creation of jobs.’32 
Resting on a default model of the perfectly competitive market, labour regulations are assumed 
inexorably to raise unemployment and informal employment and impede growth.33 Although 
complicated by its tolerance of the right collectively to bargain, Doing Business absorbs and reflects 
the orthodox account, by advising constrained expectations of the intensity of non-core regulation 
(in the sense of demands on the employer, whether administrative, financial, work organization, 
hiring strategy etc.)  
 
The details of how the EWI sub-indices prize minimal regulation has been extensively mapped in the 
literature.34 In the ‘difficult of hiring’ sub-indice, for example, restrictions on the purposes or 
maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts are downgraded while redundancy 
regulations rank highest when their costs (advance notice requirements, severance payments and 
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33
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penalties for terminating redundant workers) are minimal.35 In consequence, the EWI generates an 
account of the intensity of labour law much diminished from the frameworks and regulatory 
techniques that are embedded in the related international norms and in most domestic-level 
regimes.36 This deregulatory orientation has endured despite periodic adjustments to the 
methodology. To single out a striking illustration derived from the 2014 dataset, for example, it is 
apparent that the highest score under the ‘Rigidity of Hours’ sub-indice can be accorded to legal 
systems that permit weekly hours uninhibited by constraints other than a rest day.37 
 
Scholarly work has also identified orthodox economic theory to harbour a - more elusive - theory of 
how regulatory frameworks operate. Deakin has prised a discrete account of law from orthodox 
theory.38 In this account, he points out, legal regulation emerges as an ’an external force imposed 
upon an otherwise ‘unregulated’ market.’39 Since laws operate as an external imposition on market 
relations, legal rules therefore appear as exogenous to the labour market. This narrative, further, 
carries an associated assumption about the operation of laws: that they are ‘complete,’ in the sense 
of certain in scope of application and self-executing.40 A formalist narrative, implicitly depicts labour 
law frameworks as static and constrained: the influence of legal standards is assumed to be 
determined by their textual and institutional parameters.41 In this account, therefore, labour law is 
understood as autonomous from economic and social systems, to the detriment of an accurate 
conception of its functioning. 
 
This account of labour law’s autonomy is particularly stark in the quantified version of the flexibility 
narrative embedded in certain indicator projects. This reading of labour law frameworks underpins 
the incapacity of Doing Business indices to the de facto influence of regulatory frameworks. This 
limitation is common, and unobjectionable, in quantification projects.42 It is less persuasive, 
however, when fuelling guidance on policy reform. In the policy arena, the formalist narrative is 
particularly pertinent to the account in the Doing Business literature on the relevance of law to the 
informal economy. Centrally to the conception of the promise of legal regulation in low-income 
economies, the World Bank has crafted an image of legal regulation as entirely distinct from the 
informal economy. 43 This ‘pessimistic’ account of labour law’s promise44 hinges on a clear-cut 
dichotomy between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economies. It thereby ignores evolving formalisation 
within formal settings.45 Most pertinently to the concerns of this paper, labour standards emerge as 
unknown or entirely irrelevant to informal workers.46 Yet labour law systems are better understood 
to harbour dynamic capacities beyond their textual demands, which encompass an influence in 
informal settings (see further the discussion of ‘institutional dynamism’ in Section 3 below).  
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The post-crisis history of the EWI has been a story of decline. Forcefully criticised in the research 
literature47 and subsequently by the Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG),48 the Doing 
Business project was further discredited by an Independent Panel of Experts that reported in the 
summer of 2013.49 The EWI has been pivotal to this decline. Since the IEG report, it has been 
downplayed in Doing Business.50 The Index is no longer integrated into countries’ overall ranking,51 
Bank units are prohibited from taking it into account as an element of loan conditionality,52 and it 
has been exiled to an Annex of the annual reports.53 The Independent Panel concluded that the 
Doing Business project should endure (albeit renamed), but should be redesigned to respond to 
criticisms of its reliability and validity, including by jettisoning the aggregate ranking.54 Further, the 
Panel recommended that a careful reconsideration of the EWI methodology should be undertaken, 
outside of the Doing Business project, and should incorporate protective goals. 55 
 
More recently, the regulatory drama of the World Bank has offered both a more expansive picture 
of the substantive scope of legitimate labour regulation and a more sophisticated understanding of 
the nature and functioning of legal frameworks and of their potential economic effects. The 2013 
World Development Report (WDR2013) both confirmed the diminished internal influence of the 
Doing Business project and unveiled a new narrative on the scope, purpose and functioning of 
labour market regulation. This volte-face is the subject of the following Section. 
 
2. From underregulation bias to the regulatory plateau: the World Development Report 2013   
 
WDR2013 - entitled Jobs – acknowledges that growth does not inevitably translate into 
employment.56 (Private) employment creation is the heartbeat of the Report’s development model: 
‘[j]obs are the cornerstone of development, and development policies are needed for jobs.’57 More 
prominently than the Bank’s earlier literature, the Report acknowledges a set of social objectives for 
employment: for the individual (earnings, benefits, self-esteem, happiness) and societal-level gains 
that include investments in the education and health of children, providing alternatives to violence, 
raising living standards and – notably - ensuring both productivity and social cohesion.58 The Report 
builds on this insight to contribute to the existing typologies of ‘good jobs.’ It debuts a novel variant 
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 Independent Review Panel, Independent Panel Review of the Doing Business Report (World Bank 2013). 
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54
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introduced, the methodology reformed, and the project relocated within the World Bank. See 
‘Recommendations’ 4-6, 20-22. 
55
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56
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 Ibid 3. 
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on the available models,59 which it labels ‘good jobs for development.’60 These are jobs with ‘the 
highest payoff to society,’61 
 
[S]ome jobs also have spill overs on the living standards of others, on aggregate 
productivity, or on social cohesion. When spill overs are positive, the job has a greater 
value to society than it has to the person who holds it….62 
 
WDR2013 recommends a three-layered policy blueprint for cultivating good jobs for development, 
 
 Fundamentals are identified as a prerequisite for job creation in the private sector.63 The 
central policy fundamentals are identified as macroeconomic stability, an enabling business 
environment, human capital, and the rule of law. 
 
 Labour policies convert growth into jobs. These are defined as ‘policies and institutions’ that 
include labour market regulation, collective bargaining, active labor market programs, and 
social insurance.64  
 
 Policy Priorities. Policy actors are called on to establish the priorities that will support good 
jobs for development. In this stratum of the policy pyramid, restraints on the private sector 
in its job creation role are attributed to market imperfections and institutional failures.65 
Policy priorities allow policy actors to remove these restraints and to identify the types of 
jobs that generate optimal development outcomes.   
 
WDR2013 has been welcomed in the policy sphere for honing in on the persistent unemployment 
that has characterised the post-crisis period.66 The ‘good jobs for development’ paradigm also holds 
some promise.67 Typologies of ‘good jobs’ in the academic literature have been elaborated primarily 
in the context of the advanced industrialised economies and are ripe to be extended to low-income 
countries. Most saliently for this paper, the Report also offers a substantial recalibration of the 
Bank’s engagement with labour law. Departing from the Doing Business model of minimal 
regulation, it showcases a novel appreciation of the labour regulation/employment nexus and of the 
functioning and capacities of regulatory frameworks. The purpose of this Section is to evaluate the 
Report’s conception of labour regulation and to explore how it parallels certain advances in the 
research literature. 
 
The recent labour regulation literature has reassessed neo-classical theory’s rendering of the 
relation between legal and economic systems and the economic impacts of labour laws. In part the 
advances in this literature are methodological. Deakin has highlighted that refinements in the cross-
national measurement of labour regulations and in time series and panel data econometrics are 
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sustaining more sophisticated assessments of the economic impact of labour legislation.68 These 
research findings suggest that the effects of legal regulations on growth, employment and informal 
employment are not those predicted by orthodox economic theory.69 Macleod’s recent survey of 
empirical evidence on the impacts of EPLs, for example, has concluded that theoretical predictions 
about negative employment impacts lack empirical grounding.70 Similarly, minimum wage laws have 
been found to have no negative impact on employment and even to enhance productivity.71   
 
To argue that the potential benefits of labour regulations – both economic and social – should be 
more explicitly considered in analyses of the impacts of labour law, Lee and McCann have offered a 
model for conceptualising optimal labour regulation.72 Failure to take into account the benefits of 
regulation generates what the authors characterise as an ‘underregulation bias.’ This insight is 
reproduced in graphic form in Figure 1, which recognises that the net  benefits of labour regulations 
can be jeopardised both by regulations that are too onerous, or ill-designed, and those that are too 
minimal. In Figure 1, the minimalist approach - underregulation - is illustrated in the curve as Da’ and 
the optimal degree of regulation as Da*. 
 
Figure 1. Net benefits of labour regulations: an illustration 
 
Source: Lee and McCann (2011), Figure 1.1, adapted from Wright (2004, Figure 2)
73
 
 
WDR 2013 to a degree parallels the scholarly literature’s reassessment of the economic impacts of 
labour regulation. The Report acknowledges the substantial research findings that indicate that 
labour regulations do not inhibit job creation.74 Mirroring the conclusions of the research literature, 
it observes that the ‘[e]stimated effects [of labour regulations] prove to be relatively modest in most 
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cases – certainly more modest than the intensity of the debate would suggest.’75 The Report 
concludes, 
 
Overall, labor policies and institutions are neither the major obstacle nor the magic 
bullet for creating good jobs for development in most countries.76  
 
To reach this conclusion, WDR2013 ventures beyond the boundaries of neo-classical labour 
economics, to entertain alternative explanations for poor employment outcomes. To this end, it 
acknowledges that the crucial constraints on job creation often lie beyond the labour market, 
 
When faced with jobs challenges, policy makers tend to look first at labor policies as 
either the solution or the problem….But the main constraints to the [sic] job creation 
often lie outside the labor market, and a clear approach is needed to support 
appropriate policy responses.77  
 
Rationales are offered for poor employment outcomes in countries at a range of income levels.78 
Thus in agrarian economies, the Report suggests, low productivity in smallholder farming is most 
likely to be attributable to deficiencies in agricultural research and extension.79 In higher-income 
countries in which a lack of competition in the advanced technology sector is suggested to 
contribute to youth unemployment, ‘[c]ronyism and political favouritism’ are credited as the most 
likely culprits. 80   
 
The Report also responds to calls for the Bank to take account of the benefits of regulation. In doing 
so, the WDR2013 offers a similar analysis to Lee and McCann’s account of underregulation bias and 
optimum labour regulation, in this case expressed in an imagery of apt labour regulation as a 
plateau. The Report acknowledges the risk that labour regulations may not only be too rigid but also 
too lax, and that both rigid and weak regulatory frameworks can have detrimental effects on 
productivity.81 Between these extremes, the Bank suggests, lies a plateau of regulation of 
appropriate intensity and form. Labour policies that are not to undermine job creation, while 
maximising development payoffs from jobs, must remain on this plateau,    
   
Excessive or insufficient interventions can certainly have detrimental effects on 
productivity. But in between these extremes lies a “plateau” where effects enhancing 
and undermining efficiency can be found side by side and most of the impact is 
redistributive.82   
 
This plateau is encircled by ‘cliffs’ that denote errors of contrasting genres, 
 
Labour policy should avoid two cliffs: the distortionary interventions that clog the 
creation of jobs in cities and in global value chains, and the lack of mechanisms for voice 
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and protection from the most vulnerable workers, regardless of whether they are wage 
earners.83  
 
As Section 1 has suggested, inflexible labour laws have long haunted the regulatory visions of the 
World Bank. Rigidity’s appearance in WDR2013 as one of the cliffs of the regulatory plateau is 
therefore unexceptional. The Report cautions, 
 
Policies should seek to avoid the distortive interventions that stifle labor reallocation 
and undermine the creation of jobs in functional cities and global value chains.84   
 
The novelty of this post-crisis phase of the Bank’s engagement with labour law – central to this 
paper - is its discovery of the risks of weak labour regulation: ‘[t]his cliff may be less visible than 
excessive labour market rigidity, but it is no less real.’85 Signalling an awareness of the potential for 
underregulation bias, the report explicitly rejects minimal regulation,  
 
If rules that are too weak, or not enforced, the problems of poor information, unequal 
bargaining power, or inadequate risk management remain unaddressed.86  
 
This risks of underregulation, further, encompass the social goals of regulation. This second ‘cliff’ is 
stated to presage low living standards and disrupted social cohesion.87 
 
The significance of WDR2013, and of the image of the regulatory plateau, should not be 
understated. The Jobs Report harbours a markedly more sophisticated conception of labour 
regulation - including of its protective objectives – than the models generated by the Doing Business 
project. As such, it signals a substantial post-crisis shift in the World Bank’s tolerance of legal 
intervention in labour markets. It remains to be seen if this stance will be sustained in the Bank’s 
legal policy discourses. The 2014 World Development Report - Risk and Opportunity - is less 
exuberant: at points it recalls pre-crisis language on the hazards of regulation and the limited scope 
of feasible intervention (“[w]hile in many areas regulations can be excessive and disruptive of 
market forces, stronger regulations are needed for workplace safety, consumer protection and 
environmental preservation”).88 In contrast, the Independent Panel of Experts that reviewed Doing 
Business suggested WDR 2013 as a guide for the redesign of the project, highlighting the Report’s 
assertion that regulation can be pitched at a range of levels and varieties on the plateau.89   
 
Yet the inclusion of labour regulation on the menu of policy-makers - beyond a bland commitment 
to dismantling legal protections - inevitably generates a set of complex dilemmas about the form, 
intensity and functioning of legal regulation. The World Bank’s warmer embrace of labour law and of 
cognate regulatory frameworks is a crucial uncertainty in mapping the trajectory of international 
labour law narratives. Retaining the framework of analysis used in Section 1, two dimensions can be 
distinguished, namely the substantive scope and the functioning of regulation.  
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On the substantive dimension of the regulatory plateau, it is evident that it hosts the 1998 
Declaration’s fundamental rights. WDR2013 devotes amble space to lauding the spread of collective 
bargaining onto virgin territory. China’s decade of legislative reform on trade unions, labour 
contracts and dispute resolution is warmly endorsed.90 These legislative reforms are credited with a 
rapid growth in unionized workers and in the coverage of wage and collective agreements. The 
Report also recognises the research findings that the Chinese reforms have encouraged the direct 
election of union representatives and a growth in local and sectoral collective agreements. 91  
 
More significant is that WDR2013 extends the Bank’s vision of labour law’s domain beyond the core 
to what, at points, seems an open-ended catalogue of rights. This expansion stems from an - 
inchoate if intriguing - theory of the status of labour rights and of the normative foundation of jobs. 
Social rights emerge in the Report not merely as the preferred adjuncts of a job, but rather as 
prerequisites, 
 
All countries have subscribed to a set of universal rights….. Thus, some work activities 
are widely viewed as unacceptable and should not be treated as jobs.92  
 
This normative restriction on the nature of a job governs the breadth of the plateau. The concept of 
‘good jobs for development’ is tied to a strikingly expansive raft of international norms, which are 
characterised as embodying ‘basic human rights.’93 These norms are extensive in both subject-
matter and source: a reference to rights from international and regional frameworks94 is elaborated 
to embrace a range of international human rights instruments95 and regional regimes that include 
the European Convention on Human Rights,96 European Social Charter97 and the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights.98 WDR2013 also sidesteps the reservations about the status of 
working conditions rights that emerged in the pre-crisis era.99 The inclusion of Article 23 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights among the normative preconditions of a job, extends the 
objectives of legitimate regulation to just and favourable working conditions, protection against 
unemployment, and remuneration that ensures ‘an existence worthy of human dignity’ for the 
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worker and his family.100 Throughout, further, the Report assumes the viability of EPL and minimum 
wage frameworks that are more protective than the minimal interventions foreseen in the Doing 
Business literature.101 With respect to the ILO, as would be expected the Report references the 1998 
Declaration, and therefore the fundamental standards.102 Yet international labour standards (ILS) 
beyond the fundamental Conventions are also recognised, including, explicitly, instruments on 
working time, social security, health and safety, and labour inspection.103 
 
The World Bank’s image of the good job therefore encroaches on the ILO’s normative domain. Yet, 
to return to the question of institutional autonomy addressed in the pre-crisis era in Section 1, it is 
revealing that the regulatory expansion in WDR2013 is realised primarily through recourse to human 
rights instruments.104 Most conspicuously, the Report does not engage with a comparable expansion 
in the ILO’s legal policy narrative. The ILO’s 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization 
was adopted just prior to the global financial crisis and has shaped the ILO’s response. The 
Declaration, of equal status to its 1998 antecedent, asserts the breadth of the ILO’s policy realm. It 
highlights the four ‘strategic objectives’ in which the work of the ILO has been configured since the 
end of the last century: fundamental principles and rights, employment, social protection and social 
dialogue.105 These objectives are then characterised - in a formula akin to the concept of 
indivisibility106 - as ‘inseparable, interrelated and mutually supportive.’107 The ILO has therefore 
elevated non-core objectives of labour law frameworks within its guiding regulatory policy discourse. 
It also re-centred the improvement of working conditions by explicit reference to one of the 
Organization’s foundational texts, the Declaration of Philadelphia, specifically to its call for ‘policies 
in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure a just 
share of the fruits of progress to all and a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such 
protection.’108 
 
Yet WDR2013, despite initiating a comparable broadening of the substantive scope of legitimate 
labour regulation, does not make any reference to the 2008 Declaration. Thus the expanded 
regulatory terrain of the World Bank is not mapped to the ILO’s elaboration of the relative status of 
core and non-core rights. This omission suggests that the institutional convergence between these 
global policy actors has stalled since the crisis. The regulatory narratives of the institutions continue 
to proceed in similar trajectories, yet with limited shared reference points. As a result, the ILO’s 
normative discourses are more autonomous, yet less influential. This institutional divergence 
threatens the influence of ILS on the World Bank’s rendition of labour regulation on the plateau. It 
also hints at a diminished status for the ILO, at least in the Bank’s policy discourses.109 It also 
threatens to obscure ILO normative frameworks and policy discourses that could suggest regulatory 
strategies, standards and outcomes for regulation on the plateau. Certainly the ILO’s minimum 
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wages110 and employment protection111 standards do not trouble the WDR2013 analysis of the 
parameters of the kindred domestic legal frameworks (see further Section 3.1 below).112  
 
On the nature and functioning of legal regulation, second, Section 1 identified as a key criticism of 
the Doing Business methodology that it does not account for the de facto influence of legal rules on 
the practices of working life and, therefore, for the effectiveness of legal norms. One of the central 
contributions of the recent literature is to pinpoint legal effectiveness as a key dilemma of 
contemporary labour market regulation.113 Comparable doubts about the effective functioning of 
legal frameworks haunt the World Bank’s new appreciation of labour regulation. As a starting point, 
the familiar chasm is discerned between ‘law on the books’ and ‘law in practice,’114  
 
Even in countries that have ratified the core labour standards and have laws on the 
books, children work in harmful conditions, discrimination happens in access to jobs and 
in pay, forced labor persists, and freedom of association is limited. Commitments in 
treaties, conventions, and laws may not change the institutions, practices, and 
behaviours that affect workers’ rights on their own.115  
 
Such deficiencies are explained as a function of a set of limitations of regulatory design. The Report 
lists the features of legal frameworks that preclude protected status.116 Legislative exceptions are 
illustrated by the widespread exclusion of domestic workers, family workers, workers in small 
enterprises and in export zones, and unpaid family workers in agriculture and enterprises.117 The 
complexities of regulating tripartite relations are acknowledged in an observation that the growth in 
agency-supplied labour ‘complicates legal accountability.’118 The Report also notes the constraints 
on workers in the informal economy accessing adjudication mechanisms.119 Each of these factors 
impedes effective regulation and have been well-documented in the precarious work and informality 
literatures.120 Yet this analysis neither captures the broader challenges of conceptualising the 
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complex operation of contemporary labour law frameworks nor suggests the future of regulatory 
design. These issues are addressed in the following Section. 
 
3. Towards regulatory policy for endogenous norms  
 
Given the promise that WDR2013 holds for international labour regulation policy, it is worth taking 
seriously the Bank’s image of the regulatory plateau as the locus of apt labour regulation. The 
remainder of this Section investigates the imagery of the plateau. Its aim is to reflect on the needs of 
a regulatory policy that is poised at the international level: having global resonance, acknowledging 
the diversity of country conditions, and responding to the demands of fragmented labour markets 
and of low-income settings. To offer a contribution to this multi-faceted debate, the Section 
considers whether the insights of the recent labour regulation literature can enrich the project of 
regulation on the plateau. It centres on three conceptions of the operation of legal frameworks that 
have emerged from recent insights on regulation: regulatory indeterminacy, institutional dynamism 
and the holistic assessment of precarious work regulation.   
 
3.1 Regulatory indeterminacy and the edges of the plateau 
 
As related in Section 1, the regulation research has exposed a conception of legal norms that is 
embedded in conventional economic narratives: external impositions on an otherwise well-
functioning market that are self-executing and protect all workers within their formal scope.121 A 
contrasting imagery, grounded in the neo-institutional tradition, offers an alternative depiction of 
legal frameworks, in which legal rules are recognised as endogenous and context-dependent.122 As 
Deakin has elaborated, 
 
In this approach, legal rules are understood as devices for coordinating the expectations 
of actors under conditions of uncertainty. Laws are not simply imposed in a top-down 
fashion but, just as often, crystallize conventions which first emerge at the level of 
exchange relations before being formalized in contractual agreements and, at a further 
level, legal texts….. To understand labour law in this way is to see it not as an external 
force imposed upon an otherwise ‘unregulated’ market, but as endogenous to market 
processes and political structures.123 
 
Conceiving of legal rules as endogenous norms in this way has implications for understanding their 
influence on the practice of working relations. In Deakin’s words, ’the operation of legal rules 
depends upon contextual factors which vary across time and space.’124 The recognition that labour 
regulations are endogenous and their effects context-dependent therefore precludes any universally 
applicable threshold for ‘good’ labour regulations.125 There is no reason, that is to say, to assume 
that the benefits curve in Figure 1 (above) will be identical across countries. In fact it would be 
expected that the curve would vary, as illustrated by the curve for Country B in Figure 1. This insight 
is reflected in the recent literature in the recognition of the indeterminacy of legal norms. The 
notion of regulatory indeterminacy emerged in the work of Deakin and Sarkar to convey that the 
economic effects of labour law reform projects are a priori indeterminate126 and has since been 
developed by  Lee and McCann into a notion of ‘protective indeterminacy,’ to capture indeterminacy 
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in the protective strength of labour regulations.127 Regulatory indeterminacy implies that that 
translation of legal standards into working practices depends upon factors beyond law.  
 
WDR2013 recognises the potential for fluctuation in the effects of legal norms, both cross-national 
and temporal: ‘[the e]dges of plateau vary across countries and even within countries over time, as 
conditions change…’128 In this regard, the Report partially integrates the insights of the research 
literature. Regulatory indeterminacy inevitably renders the optimal form and intensity of laws on the 
regulatory plateau difficult to predict. The project of mapping the edges of the plateau therefore 
becomes crucial to the Bank’s renewed assessment of labour regulation. In WDR2013, this quest is 
centred substantially on EPLs and minimum wage regulations: “[t]he main challenge is to set EPL and 
minimum wages so that they address the imperfections in the labor market without falling off the 
plateau.”129 The range of countries that host appropriate legal frameworks appears to be fairly 
extensive: ‘[m]any countries appear to set EPL and minimum wages in a range where impacts on 
employment or productivity are modest.’130 The crucial challenge, however, is not identifying the 
potential scope of plateau but instead the intricate puzzle of fixing its edges at country level. 
 
In this regard, the indications of the Bank’s assessment of the edges of the plateau in WDR2013 are 
not fully convincing. The rim of the plateau is conveyed primarily as an assertion about the effects of 
two labour law projects: EPLs at state-level in India and minimum wage legislation in Colombia. To 
illustrate rigid legislation, the report contends that (1) Indian states with ‘more restrictive’ EPL have 
significantly lower employment and output and that (2) increases in the Colombian minimum wage 
in the late 1990s resulted in substantial employment loss.131 Yet the evidence cited in support of the 
Report’s contentions is strikingly slim. Evidence on the effects of state laws in India is drawn 
primarily from the work of Ahsan and Pagés132; the other studies cited are not directly relevant.133 
The assessment of the effects of the Colombian minimum wage is based on Kucera and Roncolato,134 
who explicitly stress that the Colombian case is not representative and conclude that it is best 
understood as an illustration that ‘badly designed and implemented labour regulations can have 
negative repercussions.’135 Most significantly, the Bank’s assessment does not account for the range 
of alternative explanations for economic impacts, even those reflected in more sophisticated 
analyses elsewhere in the Report (see Section 2 above).136 It can be suggested that careful 
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measurement is needed to identify apt regulatory systems for a particular country context that will 
generate the optimal degree of regulation on the benefits curve. More broadly, the abstract and 
static depiction of legal measures characteristic of conventional economic theory should be replaced 
by models that capture the intricacies of regulatory design and implementation.137 Detailed 
knowledge of the context (institutional frameworks, enforcement mechanisms, social norms etc.) is 
therefore necessary for the effects of labour law reforms to be predicted.138  
 
3.2 Institutional dynamism  
 
A second dimension of regulation on the plateau is hinted at by an aside in WDR2013 on the 
operation of legal regulation in the informal economy. The Report mentions in passing the evidence 
of ‘lighthouse effects’ of minimum wage reforms, through which increases in the minimum wage 
function as a reference wage for the informal economy.139 This observation is a partial recognition of 
a phenomenon that has a more significant potential for regulatory policy on endogenous norms. It 
was noted in Section 1 above that the formalist policy narrative on the economic impact of labour 
regulation reads labour law frameworks as static and constrained. This literature assumes that the 
influence of legal frameworks is determined by their textual and institutional parameters. Recent 
contributions suggest, however, that labour law systems are better understood to harbour dynamic 
capacities beyond their formal demands.  
 
Lee and McCann have proposed the notion of institutional dynamism to account for the capacity of 
legal frameworks to operate beyond their formal parameters.140 Intended for analytical, 
measurement and policy purposes, institutional dynamism can be classified as external or internal in 
form. External dynamism denotes the influence of labour law norms beyond their formal reach. It 
therefore embraces the range of processes alluded to in WDR2013 - and as yet imperfectly 
understood - through which labour norms take effect in informal settings (adherence to norms of 
social behaviour, awareness of statutory standards141 etc.) In its internal form, institutional 
dynamism denotes the capacity of regulatory regimes to host multiple interactions between a range 
of institutions. A key illustration is the operation of ‘ripple effects,’ through which increases in the 
minimum wage affect wages above its level.142  
 
The notion of institutional dynamism offers a useful imagery of legal norms, which can inform 
regulation on the plateau. It has been argued to be both a significant component of regulatory 
indeterminacy and a gateway to improved protective outcomes.143 Yet WDR2013 does not fully 
grasp the dynamic potential of regulatory frameworks. The ‘pessimistic’ account of domestic 
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frameworks outlined in Section 1, which disregards informal economies as sites of regulatory 
intervention, has been tempered. Envisaging a protective future for the informal economy, the 
Report asserts that vulnerable workers should have mechanisms for voice and protection ‘regardless 
of whether they are wage earners.’144 In elaborating the needs of workers in informal relations, 
however, the Report centres primarily on social protection frameworks145 (although noting the 
evolving role of associations of self-employed workers in protecting legal rights, through negotiating 
with governments, for example, and pursuing litigation strategies on e.g. the construction of malls, 
harassment, confiscation of inventories).146  
 
Other interventions that act on informal working relations, however, are not fully integrated into the 
analysis. The regulatory plateau model would benefit from considering mechanisms that are tailored 
to improving the quality of jobs in informal work. Minimum wage legislation is an obvious candidate 
as a site of experimentation with institutional dynamism in both forms. Recent research on Europe 
has found ripple effects of minimum wage legislation to enhance pay equity, through their impact on 
low-wage employment, gender pay inequality and wage compression in the lower half of the wage 
structure. Grimshaw Rubery and Bosch have found an association between ripple effects and strong 
– dual or inclusive147 – industrial relations systems, and that unions with defined pay equity 
strategies can heighten these effects.148 Ripple effects are also worth investigating in low-income 
countries. They can be substantial where minimum wages are used by workers as basis for wage 
negotiation.149 This phenomenon has recently been observed in Asian countries, including the 
Philippines, China and Vietnam,150 and strengthens the negotiation role of associations of informal 
workers that is already foreseen by the Bank. This evidence points to a significant if neglected policy 
role for the minimum wage, in which it is available to integrate into formalization and poverty 
alleviation strategies in low-income countries.151 
 
3.3 The holistic analysis of precarious work regulation    
 
Finally, the World Bank’s new policy discourse on labour regulation is conspicuously tentative in its 
treatment of non-standard forms of work.152 WDR2013 calls for legal protections for ‘the most 
vulnerable.’153 The analysis neglects, however, the tendency of non-standard configurations to both 
disrupt the certainties of conventional regulatory frameworks and also, in recent decades, to propel 
labour law towards novel regulatory forms. This neglect is more broadly resonant of contemporary 
labour regulation policy.154 Yet the recent research has cited the accelerating fragmentation of 
labour markets as one of the key drivers of regulatory indeterminacy and elaborated these 
fragmentation processes to include both heightened recourse to non-standard working 
arrangements and the intersecting pressures that generate informality.155 This fragmentation 
generates a divergent application of legal entitlements and obligations, thus triggering substantial 
variation in the effectiveness of regulatory frameworks. 
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Yet labour market fragmentation is challenging to conceptualize in research, and in particular to 
capture through the use of empirical methods,156 thus inhibiting an accurate understanding of the 
nature and influence of labour regulation on the plateau. As a contribution towards unravelling the 
complexities of this project at the conceptual level, a holistic analysis of non-standard work 
regulation has been proposed, to suggest that the nature and effects of labour law should be 
understood to be in part defined by the legal treatment of non-standard workers.157 In consequence, 
it is contended, analyses of labour law sub-fields should no longer focus exclusively on generally-
applicable norms; instead, they should be expanded to integrate the governance of non-standard 
work. The holistic strategy, further, can readily be expanded to embrace analyses of the regulation 
of informal working relations. This conceptual strategy expands the analysis of regulation to 
embrace protective lacunae and also the bespoke norms that have been devised to protect workers 
in non-standard and informal relations. It thereby offers a more accurate and comprehensive 
understanding of the evolution of labour law.  
 
The primary contribution of WDR2013 on non-standard work was noted in Section 2: the Bank 
acknowledges the tendency of multipartite working relations to repel labour law’s protective 
reach.158 Yet no solution is ventured for this problem, and regulatory options already under 
experimentation are ignored (specific allocation of legal obligations, joint liability, restrictions on the 
supply of agency work etc.)159 The legal policy response to informality, further, brakes at efforts to 
expand social protection and representation and negotiation by associations of the self-employed. A 
holistic analysis of the regulation of non-standard work and the informal economy would further 
refine the paradigm of the regulatory plateau to advance effective regulation. This is an arena, for 
example, in which the Bank’s recent neglect of ILO non-core standards, outlined in Section 2, 
obscures regulatory techniques. Regulatory strategies that are widely deployed in European 
domestic legal orders can be derived from the ILO’s non-standard work instruments.160 Conventional 
forms of regulation also remain relevant. The potential of the minimum wage as a site of 
experimentation with external dynamism was outlined in Section 3.2. Yet, the regulatory plateau 
model would also benefit from absorbing formalisation strategies of the kind advocated by Fenwick 
et al161 and, more recently, in McCann and Murray’s investigation of domestic work as an entry-point 
for legal regulation of informal working relations.162  
 
Conclusions 
 
The regulatory trajectory of the crisis era can be parsed, schematically, as an early embrace of 
forceful market regulation upended by a reversion to the deregulatory orthodoxy. It is notable, then, 
that the progression of the World Bank’s account of labour regulation over this period has been 
towards a tentative embrace of protective goals. Building on Rittich’s analysis of the fragmentation 
of international labour law, this paper has assumed that the World Bank, having adopted a guiding 
role in disseminating labour governance norms,163 will be crucial to labour law’s future. It is 
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therefore essential that scholarly accounts of labour regulation accurately portray the imagery of 
labour law generated by this institution.  
 
The paper has suggested that a critical relationship within the international legal policy scene - 
between the World Bank and ILO – is best understood as a dynamic process of institutional 
convergence and divergence. This interaction, further, can be read to generate a conversation about 
the objectives, format and tenor of labour market regulation. Within this frame, the paper has 
reappraised the Doing Business project as substantially pivoting on the core/non-core narrative 
donated by the ILO. The declining fortunes of Doing Business, sealed by WDR2013, heralded a 
pronounced shift in World Bank discourses towards an imagery of a regulatory plateau.  
 
The plateau narrative is open to more expansive substantive policy goals than its antecedents and 
hosts a more sophisticated understanding of the nature, functioning and economic effects of legal 
regulation. Yet the precise content of the favoured regulatory frameworks has yet to emerge. A halt 
in the Bank’s institutional dance with the ILO has exiled the ILS, distancing a useful source of 
regulatory models. Further, in recognising the potential for fluctuating effects the Bank offers a 
glimpse of Deakin’s analysis of legal regulation, of endogenous norms with context-dependent 
impacts. Yet it does not fully confront the challenges of regulatory design for endogenous norms. 
WDR2013 ushered the Bank into the uncertain world of contextualised labour regulation. This paper 
has raised a set of crucial challenges for conceptualising such legal frameworks, of indeterminate 
outcomes, dynamic norms and the destabilising presence of precarious work. It has suggested that 
the response should be a sustained, and more curious, engagement with the complexities and 
capacities of labour regulation. 
 
